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Abstract
A highly infectious disease (HID) that is transmissible from person to person causes life-threatening illness and presents a serious hazard
in the healthcare setting and in the community that requires speciﬁc control measures. Due to environmental factors, changes in life-
style and many other unknown factors, the emergence of such HIDs is becoming more and more likely. As has already been demon-
strated during the SARS outbreak, healthcare facilities are likely to be the origin of future HID outbreaks. Preparedness planning will be
essential in helping facilities manage future outbreaks of emerging or resurgent infectious diseases. Guidelines have been developed by
national and international institutions. To avoid contamination of healthcare workers, the care of HID patients should follow the same
infection control rules that are applied to laboratory workers exposed to similar agents. Here, the current knowledge concerning the
clinical care of patients with HIDs is reviewed, and speciﬁc aspects of the management of such diseases are introduced.
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Introduction
During recent decades, many new and re-emerging diseases
have threatened public health and have posed new challenges
to infectious disease specialists worldwide. The expansion of
the human population results in a greater proximity to the
habitat of wildlife, and a massive urbanization process, both
of which facilitate the emergence of new zoonoses and the
rapid spread of communicable diseases among humans. Tra-
velling throughout the world in a few hours has become
increasingly frequent. This leads to a new epidemiological
situation where the risk of worldwide contagion is more and
more present, while the preparedness of hospitals in the face
of this situation is still at an early stage of development [26].
Imported highly infectious diseases (HIDs) such as Lassa
fever [19] and other haemorrhagic fever viruses, have been
reported many times in the literature but have seldom been
at the origin of an outbreak, except for SARS. Experience
shows that the recognition and isolation of a new infectious
agent is often followed by reports of a laboratory-acquired
infection caused by the new isolate [24]. Among class 3 and
4 agents, laboratory-associated infections have been reported
with the agents of epidemic typhus [50], murine typhus [48],
Q fever [18], tularaemia [23], pulmonary plague [9], Lassa
fever [25], Rocky Mountain Spotted fever [33], melioidosis
[38], and with Herpes B virus simiae [16], Hantaan virus
[20,24], tick borne encephalitis virus [46], sabia virus [6],
West Nile virus [1,2], and vaccine [28]. More recently SARS
coronavirus (CoV) was laboratory acquired [27], raising con-
cern with respect to biosafety [32]. Although laboratories
that handled class 3 and 4 agents should comply with biosaf-
ety regulations, laboratory leakage may occur at any time
when working with a known agent, but also when attempting
to isolate an unknown infectious agent such as a mimivirus
[37]. Infection of a single laboratory worker with a highly
infectious agent is likely to be at the origin of an outbreak,
especially if the agent has the capability of human-to-human
transmission such as happened with the SARS CoV [27].
Terrorist attacks using biological agents are a substantial
threat to the safety, health and security of citizens. As the
2001 anthrax attacks illustrated, only a small amount of agent
is required to have a tremendous impact in terms of morbid-
ity, cost, and mental health [30]. These consequences would
probably have been exponentially greater if the terrorists
had utilized an agent that causes a communicable disease,
because this could have resulted in the rapid spread of sec-
ondary infection [30]. As a consequence, preparedness will
be essential in the management of future outbreaks, and net-
working is an essential approach for success (see Ippolito
et al. in this issue).
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A number of deﬁnitions will be useful in preparing readers
for this special section concerning Europe’s preparedness to
face HIDs.
A highly infectious disease (HID), which is transmissible from
person to person, causes a life-threatening illness and presents
a serious hazard in healthcare settings and in the community,
requiring speciﬁc control measures [7]. The agents responsible
for these diseases are class 3 and 4 agents as deﬁned by the
CDC in the 5th edition of the Biosafety in Microbiological and
Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) manual [45].
A highly infectious disease isolation unit (HLIU) is a ‘health-
care facility speciﬁcally designed to provide safe, secure,
high-quality and appropriate care, with optimal infection con-
tainment and infection prevention and control procedures
for a single patient or small number of patients who have, or
who may have, a highly infectious disease’ [7].
Levels of biosecurity were ﬁrst deﬁned for the laboratory
according to the assessed risk of transmission to humans
and the possible threat. Infectious agents classiﬁed as class 2
must be handled at Bio Safety Level (BSL) 2, as must class 3
agents at BSL 3 and class 4 agents at BSL 4 laboratories. To
asses this level of biosecurity, guidelines have been drawn up
by the CDC in the 5th edition of the BMBL manual [45] and
by the WHO in the 2nd edition of the Laboratory Safety
manual [47]. Considering the fact that, in some situations,
such as cough, the inoculums spread by the patient to whom
the employees are exposed are likely to be equivalent to
those encountered by a laboratory worker when handling
specimens, the care of such patients should be undertaken in
BSL 3 or 4 wards to ensure the same level of protection and
security for healthcare workers (HCWs) as that for labora-
tory workers exposed to the same agent. Situations that
indicate the use of such a HLIU are those in which class 3
or 4 agents are suspected to be at the origin of the disease.
This is obviously also based upon the capability of the agent
to achieve human-to-human transmission, and the availability
of primary or secondary prophylaxis such as vaccines of
effective antimicrobial therapy. The risk group classiﬁcation
of infectious agents for laboratory practice [4,45] does not
correspond precisely to the risk group classiﬁcation for clini-
cal practice, and recommendations for a minimum isolation
level of the patient in the healthcare setting will be published
elsewhere [8].
Concerning the isolation room and ward for care of HID
patients, a BSL 3 ward is deﬁned as a ward fulﬁlling the
criteria of a BSL 3 level laboratory [45,49]. Brieﬂy, it is a
negative pressure ward with an anteroom and single-bed
rooms. The air is high efﬁciency particulate air (HEPA) ﬁl-
tered and expelled outside; the intake is HEPA ﬁltered; the
number of air changes is at least 12 per hour (depending on
national law); and depressurization is monitored by an audi-
ble and visual device as recommended by the American Insti-
tute of Architects [5] and described in the Health Care
facility design resource manual published by the Phoenix
Controls corporation [35] (Fig. 1). Although no speciﬁc pres-
sure differential is required by the BMBL, a common differen-
tial used in BSL 3 laboratories and which should be applied
to wards within the same context is approximately 0.05 WC
(12.45 Pa). However, some biosafety manuals, such as the
3rd edition of the Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines (Health
Canada, Ottawa), recommend a differential of ±25 Pa [3].
In this particular setting, the access for a patient into the
HLIU should be different from that of HCWs and other
patients. A BSL 4 ward is a BSL 3 ward built separately from
other patients’ facilities, for which the air ﬁltration should be
double HEPA ﬁltered. A double door pass through autoclave
is mandatory. All entering employees must completely
change clothing, and before leaving they should shower
before putting their street clothing on [45,49]. All efﬂuents
should be decontaminated. A framework for the design and
operation of an HLIU has been recently released by the Eur-
opean Network of Infectious Diseases [7]. Negative-pressure
plastic isolators for patients with dangerous infections have
been envisaged since the early 1980s. The ‘isolator system’
was set up in an attempt to treat patients with suspected
haemorrhagic fever [43] and some are still in use (see Fusco
et al. in this issue). Since the SARS epidemic, several other
ambulatory concept isolation rooms with HEPA ﬁltration
units have become commercially available.
Management of Suspected HID Patients
Respiratory hygiene and the ‘cough etiquette’
Based on studies of SARS transmission, it appears that mea-
sures designed to control respiratory droplets and secre-
tions, along with hand hygiene, would offer signiﬁcant
protection for other patients and HCWs who have close
contact with source patients [10,40]. Given the challenge of
recognizing early cases of HID, and considering the potential
spread of respiratory infections in healthcare settings, a
broader strategy to prevent healthcare-associated transmis-
sion of respiratory illnesses has been suggested. The CDC
healthcare facility guidelines describe a new approach to
managing patients with febrile respiratory illness, which has
been termed ‘respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette’. Patients
with cough and fever should be encouraged to report symp-
toms at admission [10]. Patients with fever and cough should
be asked to separate themselves from other patients in the
waiting area, to wear a surgical mask, and to disinfect their
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hands. Signs concerning ‘etiquette’ should be posted in the
waiting areas to promote these measures and educate both
the patients and the HCWs. These patients should be exam-
ined and evaluated as soon as possible by the emergency staff
in a single room. The emergency staff should wear at least
FFP1 or 2 (N95) personal protective mask, gown and gloves.
Chest X-ray should be performed separately from other
patients by HWCs wearing mask and gloves as described
above. When pneumonia is diagnosed upon chest X-ray, a
systematic examination of sputum for Alcohol addiction resis-
tant should be undertaken. The transfer of a patient to the
infectious diseases ward or other ward should be done by an
employee protected with a mask, and the patient should be
isolated in a single room with droplet precaution; this isola-
tion must be maintained until the diagnosis is established.
There are three situations in which a patient would need
to be admitted into an HLIU. The ﬁrst involves a patient
returning from abroad where an epidemic due to a yet-
unknown contagious agent, or due to known class 3 or 4
agents such as SARS CoV, is ongoing. In this context, inter-
national surveillance of emerging infectious diseases and out-
breaks is mandatory, and is being organized in Europe and
throughout the world. Epidemic intelligence encompasses all
activities related to early identiﬁcation of potential health
hazards to further establish a risk assessment (see Arias
Bohigas et al. in this issue). The second situation involves a
laboratory worker contaminated during duty in a registered
BL 3 or 4 laboratory [27,39], and the third involves a single
patient or several patients who have been contaminated by
intentionally released class 3 or 4 agents (i.e. bioterrorism).
It is likely that if an outbreak of human-to-human transmissi-
ble disease begins in one country, that country may miss the
ﬁrst case. This emphasizes the importance of routine respira-
tory and hand hygiene in the healthcare setting, and of man-
datory surveillance of healthcare personnel [29].
Admission to the emergency department
In most instances, a patient suspected to be infected with a
highly contagious agent, such as SARS Co-V, would be
referred to the emergency department (ED) of a general
hospital until a suitable network for the care of such patients
is effectively established at a national level. Thus, the EDs of
all hospitals should be prepared for such an event, and both
training and an infrastructure should be available [29]. These
patients are usually referred by general practitioners for a
suspected HID. If they correspond to the case deﬁnition
FIG. 1. Example of an airborne isolation room with protective environment (anteroom positive pressure to corridor) as described in reference [35].
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they should be directly placed in an HLIU or in isolation
rooms (IR) of the ED, if available, until a ﬁrm diagnosis is
made and the suspected HID is ruled out. During admission
to the ED, the patient should avoid any contact with other
patients and unprotected HCWs, meaning that direct access
from outside to the IR or the HLIU is necessary [42]. IRs in
the ED should be at least BSL 2 level, preferably upgraded to
BSL 3, with an independent negative pressure air system if
possible (Fig. 1). While general respiratory hygiene rules
(‘cough etiquette’) apply to every ED of each general hospi-
tal, IRs or HLIUs might apply to referral hospitals, only as
HID patients are referred. A patient with a possible or con-
ﬁrmed HID, if not admitted directly to a HLIU, should be
transferred from the IR of the ED to the HLIU in a secured
manner by using, if possible, safe isolator transportation
systems [17] (see Schilling et al. in this issue) .
Diagnosis laboratory
To reduce the risk of transmission to HCWs, patient sampling
should be done in the IR at the ED or directly in the HLIU,
depending on the availability of facilities. It is important to
remember that the ﬁrst aetiology of fever in a traveller from a
tropical region is malaria and that this diagnosis is far more
likely than that of an emerging HID. All diagnostic tests should
be carried out, if possible, in a BSL 3/4 laboratory, including
routine haematology and clinical chemistry as well as blood
ﬁlm for malaria. The BSL 3/4 diagnostic laboratory should be
located as near as possible to the HLIU, to avoid unnecessary
transportation [7]. Even if the use of an auto-analyser might be
safe for sample analysis, handling of a sample suspected to be
highly contagious, such as Ebola virus-contaminated blood,
cannot be done safely in a routine laboratory. An alternative is
that routine testing is done in the HLIU at the patient’s bed-
side. Consequently, related research and the development of
bedside or point-of-care diagnostic testing models are manda-
tory. This is one of the objectives of the European network of
BSL 3/4 laboratories, which develops, standardizes and orga-
nizes quality assurance exercises for new diagnostic assays
(see Ippolito et al. in this issue).
Hospitalization in the HLIU
Among the existing HLIUs, some are revertible (i.e. BSL 3
wards that are routinely used as infectious diseases wards
but which can be rapidly converted to a BSL 3 ward); others
are dedicated to such situations (see Fusco et al. in this
issue) (Fig. 2). The number of HLIUs required per country
has been suggested to be a number sufﬁcient to allow trans-
portation of specimens or patients within 6 h [7]. The HLIU
should preferably be located alongside a tertiary (specialist
referral) hospital. It would, preferably, be a stand-alone
structure [7] with engineering and operational protocols
appropriate for positioning within a multi-storey building.
The current philosophy of the HLIU is that infection control
should take precedence over all other aspects of care, and
that care of HID patients should be provided in the HLIU
only (see Fusco et al. in this issue). Radiography should be
provided at bedside to avoid transportation of the patient
[11,14], and interpreted using a picture archiving communica-
tion system if available [42,44]. An ultrasound sonographic
scanner should be speciﬁcally designed and kept in the HLIU.
The transducer should be covered with disposable covers
for all patients. The examination should be kept as short as
possible, only as necessary to determine the clinical situation.
Because computed tomography scan or magnetic resonance
imaging is sometimes mandatory for the patient’s survival,
preparations should be made to reconﬁgure the radiology
department into low- and high-risk areas, to reprogramme
examination, and to identify speciﬁc transportation of
patients from the HLIU, using isolation carriers as necessary.
It is strongly recommended to train radiology personnel in
infection control measures.
Paediatric patients
Nosocomial infection has been identiﬁed as a major problem
in paediatric wards and compliance with isolation procedures
has to be ensured [13,36]. During the SARS epidemic, the
stringent infection control measures inevitably conﬂicted with
the usual family-centred nursing practices [21]. However, for
infection control reasons, in cases of HID, family interaction
should be minimized and all children suspected of having HIDs
should be hospitalized in an HLIU. For this reason, HLIUs
should be equipped to care for children and the paediatric
staff must be speciﬁcally trained in infection control.
Intensive care
The risk of being infected with SARS CoV among physicians
and nurses who performed or assisted in endotracheal intu-
bation in the ICU has been reported to be approximately 13
times higher than that among those who did not [15]. This
might be explained by the fact that patients admitted to ICUs
are usually severely ill, coinciding with a high viral load and
maximum infectiousness [34]. ICU personnel are conse-
quently exposed to highly pathogenic agents and it is always
prudent to limit opportunities for HCW exposure and to
perform aerosol-generating procedures in an airborne isola-
tion environment. Meticulous infection control measures are
mandatory in the care of such patients. For this reason, cau-
tion should be taken to ensure that ICU rooms are main-
tained with a negative pressure and a minimum of 15
air changes per hour as recommended by the WHO [49].
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The ventilation of IRs is mandatory in the ICU and usually
both negative and positive air pressure are available [31].
Although positive air pressure and HEPA ﬁltration of the
incoming airﬂow are mandatory for the protection of immu-
nocompromised patients, in settings such as HIDUs the air-
ﬂow pressure should be negative and the airﬂow exhaust
through HEPA ﬁlter should be as recommended for BSL 3
IRs. The European Network for Infectious Diseases recom-
mends that the care of HID patients who require intensive
care should take place in the HLIU if possible [8]. This sug-
gests that HLIUs should be pre-equipped to receive intensive
care support. Moreover, the ICU personnel, as the paediatric
personnel, should be appropriately trained in infection con-
trol in this special setting (eee Bannister et al. in this issue).
HCWs are particularly exposed to high-risk procedures such
as bag-mask ventilation, non-invasive ventilation, endotracheal
intubation, actual or potential circuit disconnections, suction-
ing, tracheotomy and bronchoscopy, with or without
bronchoalveolar lavage. Recommendations for infection con-
trol in patients with HID during special procedures will be
discussed elsewhere [8].
The literature concerning HID, notably SARS, indicates that
there is a need for hospitals to be prepared for this possibility
and that HID isolation units urgently need to be built in
European member state hospitals. The care of HID patients
involves stringent infection control measures and regular
training of personnel. The articles presented in this theme sec-
tion of Clinical Microbiology and Infection review the knowledge
and current European practices in the care of HID patients.
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